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Incentive compensation induces correlation between the portfolio of managers and the cash 
flow of the firms they manage. This correlation exposes managers to risk and hence gives 
them an incentive to hedge against the poor performance of their firms. We study the agency 
problem between shareholders and a manager when the manager can hedge his incentive 
compensation using financial markets and shareholders cannot perfectly monitor the 
manager’s portfolio in order to keep him from hedging the risk in his compensation. In 
particular, shareholders can monitor the manager’s portfolio stochastically, and since 
monitoring is costly governance is imperfect. If managerial hedging is detected, shareholders 
can seize the payoffs of the manager’s trades. We show that at the optimal contract: (i) the 
manager’s portfolio is monitored only when the firm performs poorly, (ii) the more costly 
monitoring is, the more sensitive is the manager’s compensation to firm performance, and (iii) 
conditional on the firm’s performance, the manager’s compensation is lower when his 
portfolio is monitored, even if no hedging is revealed by monitoring. 
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The objective of incentive compensation is to induce a correlation between managers’
compensation and the cash ﬂow of the ﬁrms they manage so as to induce them to work
diligently and increase ﬁrm performance.1 But this correlation exposes managers
to risk and hence gives them an incentive to trade in ﬁnancial markets so as to
hedge against the poor performance of their ﬁrms. In the 1990s several ﬁnancial
instruments have been developed which allow managers to hedge the ﬁrm speciﬁc
risk in their compensation packages. Examples of such instruments include zero-
cost collars, equity swaps, and basket hedges. While little data exist, oﬀ-the-record
interviews with investment bankers reported in the press suggest that the market for
executive hedging instruments is sizable (hundreds of millions of dollars according to
the Economist (1999a)), and that most large investment banks oﬀer such instruments
(see Puri (1997), Smith (1999), and Lavelle (2001)).
Legal and ﬁnancial commentators generally share the opinion that managerial
hedging undermines incentives in executive pay schemes, signiﬁcantly alters the exec-
utives’ eﬀective ownership of the ﬁrm, and hence has adverse eﬀects on performance.2
Boards and shareholders should recognize that managers might have the opportunity
to hedge their incentive compensation packages and design their managers’ incentive
schemes accordingly. If shareholders were able to perfectly observe the managers’
transactions, they could explicitly rule out the possibility that managers trade any
hedging instruments. In practice, managers’ portfolios are diﬃcult and costly to
monitor. For one, disclosure rules regarding managerial transactions of hedging in-
struments are relatively lax,3 and only few trades are eﬀectively disclosed to investors
and shareholders.4 Moreover, ﬁnancial markets have proved quite eﬀective in design-
ing instruments which overcome regulation and tax laws that are introduced. For
1For evidence on the relationship between managerial incentives and ﬁrm performance see, e.g.,
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), and Jensen and Murphy (1990). See Murphy (1999) for a
survey on incentive compensation.
2In the legal profession, see Easterbrook (2002), Schizer (2000), Bank (1994/5); in the ﬁnancial
press, see the editorial pieces in the Economist (1999a,b,c,2002), Ip (1997), Lavelle (2001), Puri
(1997), and Smith (1999).
3Since September 1994 equity swaps and similar instruments must be reported to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), on Table II of Form 4; Release No. 34-34514 and Release No.
34-347260. But the back-page of Table II of Form 4 is not included in the electronic ﬁling used by
analysts; see Bolster, Chance, and Rich (1996) and Lavelle (2001). Finally, non-insiders and CEOs
of non-U.S. ﬁrms are not obligated to disclose their trades. Recently, though, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 introduced more stringent rules regarding the electronic ﬁling of transactions involving
such instruments and has substantially reduced the delay in disclosure, when disclosure is required.
4In 1994 only 1 hedging transaction was disclosed to the SEC, Autotote’s CEO equity swap, the
case studied by Bolster, Chance, and Rich (1996). The number of transaction reported in subsequent
years increased to 15 transaction in 1996, 39 in 1997, and 35 in 1998 (the whole 90 transactions
are studied by Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2001)), 31 transaction in 2000 (Lavelle (2001)). No
evidence is yet available about the eﬀects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on disclosures.
2instance, equity swaps have been substituted with collars when swaps became subject
to more stringent tax treatment (Schizer (2000)). Basket hedges, in which the deriv-
ative’s value is based not only on the stock price of the employer but also on a basket
of correlated stocks, are eﬀective hedging instruments which require signiﬁcant time
and skills to monitor and are not subject to any regulation.5
While costly, monitoring of managers’ portfolios can nonetheless help to align
shareholders’ and managers’ objectives within an optimal incentive compensation
contract. Managers are not restricted by law from trading derivatives on stocks of
their own ﬁrm,6 but may be subject to derivative suits brought by shareholders for
violation of ﬁduciary duty if ﬁnancial transactions to hedge their incentive compen-
sation are revealed.7 For transactions disclosed to the SEC, shareholders can force
executives to satisfy their burden of establishing the validity of the transaction. When
instead monitoring reveals evidence of breach of disclosure, action can be pursued
under securities law, which is easier than under corporate law (Fox (1999)).8 Suc-
cessful legal action allows a monetary recovery to the ﬁrm at least in the amount of
the managers’ gains on the hedging positions that are detected.9
In this paper we study the optimal incentive compensation when managers have
access to anonymous hedging instruments in ﬁnancial markets and when shareholders
can monitor the portfolios of managers. Since, as we argued, managers’ portfolios
5At the very least executives can anonymously trade market indexes, thereby hedging the sys-
tematic risk of their compensation. This case has been studied by Jin (2002), Acharya and Bisin
(2003), and Garvey and Milbourn (2003).
6Under Section 16(c) of Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 16c-4, managers are only
prohibited from selling their ﬁrm’s stock short.
7For a discussion of the ﬁduciary principle and derivative suits see, e.g., Easterbrook and Fischel
(1991), chapter 4, and Klausner and Litvak (2000). Of course, under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, it is illegal for insiders to trade while in possession of material value-relevant
information (insider trading). While there is some evidence that the observed hedging transactions
of executives might in part constitute insider trading (see Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000)), we
concentrate in this paper on the pure hedging motives.
8Derivative suits are more easily brought against executives whose compensation contracts ex-
plicitly state trading limitations. In practice this is rarely the case; and when ﬁrms do have trading
policies, they are usually not disclosed to minority shareholders; for a detailed discussion of such
restrictions see Schizer (2000) and Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2001). This contractual practice
could be motivated by the aim of protecting the ﬁrm against “frivolous” actions of shareholders; this
is consistent with the practice of providing executives with insurance policies against such actions;
see Klausner and Litvak (2000) for a discussion. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) interpret the
limited contractual restrictions of hedging instead as evidence of managerial rent extraction. See
also Bebchuk and Fried (2003).
9Only for actions brought by the SEC for violations of the securities law can courts grant “any
equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the beneﬁt of investors,” Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, Section 305, 5. In the case of insider trading during black-out periods, e.g., it is “proﬁt
realized by a director or executive oﬃcer” that shall “be recoverable by the issuer,” Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, Section 306, 2A. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 does not explicitly state any provision
for hedging in violation of ﬁduciary duty.
3are diﬃcult to monitor we consider the case where monitoring is costly, thus less
than perfect. Hence, we study executive compensation with imperfect corporate
governance.10 Also, in accordance with the limited possibilities for legal action by
shareholders discussed above, we assume that whenever hedging by a manager is
detected, only payoﬀs that the manager would receive from this activity can be
seized by the shareholders.11
In our model of optimal incentive compensation, we show that monitoring of a
manager’s portfolio optimally occurs when the performance of the ﬁrm is poor. Since
for incentive reasons the manager’s compensation is low when the ﬁrm does poorly,
if the manager were to hedge he would buy claims which pay oﬀ when the ﬁrm does
poorly. The fact then that shareholders could seize the payoﬀs of managerial hedging,
if detected, because it violates ﬁduciary duty, implies that shareholders will monitor
the manager’s portfolio when such hedging positions would pay oﬀ, i.e., when the
ﬁrm performs poorly.
Furthermore, we show that when monitoring is costly, shareholders provide the
manager with steeper incentives (compared to the case of perfect monitoring). Thus,
worse corporate governance implies that shareholders have to give managers steeper
incentives.12 The intuition is as follows: when managerial hedging is costly to mon-
itor, managers have to be induced to refrain from hedging by the structure of the
compensation scheme rather than being forced to refrain by monitoring. Thus, share-
holders have to make it expensive for managers to hedge. This is achieved by paying
the manager more in states where the ﬁrm does well. The hedging market under-
stands that, given that a manager is hedging, he will work less diligently and hence
states with good performance are less likely, which is reﬂected in the price at which
the manager can sell these claims. In short, claims contingent on good performance
10In contrast, the theoretical literature on principal-agent problems has studied either the case
in which the agent’s trades are perfectly observable, e.g., Prescott and Townsend (1984) and Bisin
and Gottardi (2001), or the case in which they are unobservable (see Allen (1985), Arnott and
Stiglitz (1991), Kahn and Mookherjee (1998), Pauly (1974); also Admati, Pﬂeiderer, and Zechner
(1994), Bisin and Gottardi (1999), Bisin and Guaitoli (1998), Bizer and DeMarzo (1992, 1999), Cole
and Kocherlakota (2001), Park (2004), and, for applications to managerial incentive compensation,
Acharya and Bisin (2003), Garvey (1993, 1997), Garvey and Milbourn (2003), and Ozerturk (2003)).
Costly monitoring has been introduced in the study of principal agent problems by, for instance,
Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Mookherjee and Png (1989). They analyze situ-
ations where it is the realization of a privately observed state which can be monitored at a cost
(costly state veriﬁcation). Winton (1995) studies costly state veriﬁcation with multiple investors.
Baiman and Demski (1980) and Dye (1986) study environments where it is agents’ privately ob-
served eﬀort which can be monitored at a cost. To our knowledge, the only previous analysis of a
principal-agent problem with limited observability of trades, through bankruptcy procedures, is in
Bisin and Rampini (2004).
11We will show however that our main results carry over to the case where additional monetary
penalties can be imposed on the manager when hedging is detected.
12Similarly, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) ﬁnd that in countries with worse
investor protection ownership is more concentrated.
4trade at a discount in the hedging market. Thus, an increase in the steepness of com-
pensation decreases the present value of the manager’s compensation in the hedging
market and makes it more expensive for the manager to hedge.
We also show that conditional on the ﬁrm performing poorly, the optimal com-
pensation of the manager is lower when the manager is monitored, and hence his
portfolio scrutinized, than when the manager is not monitored. This is so even if
monitoring does not reveal any hedging transactions of the manager. In other words,
managers strictly prefer not to be monitored at the optimal contract, despite the fact
that they do not hedge their compensation in equilibrium. The manager’s compen-
sation both when he is monitored and when he is not monitored in states when the
ﬁrm does poorly aﬀects his incentive to work diligently. But the compensation when
the manager is not monitored also aﬀects his desire to hedge his compensation risk.
To reduce the manager’s desire to hedge his compensation, it is thus optimal to pay
him more when he is not monitored, than when he is monitored. Thus, with random
monitoring, being monitored is bad news for the manager even if he did nothing
wrong. This is empirically plausible and is interesting since it is in contrast to the
standard result in the costly state veriﬁcation literature (see footnote 10) that agents
receive a bonus when monitored and thus strictly prefer to be monitored. The key
for the result is that we assume that when the manager is monitored and hedging is
detected his pay cannot be reduced (or at most reduced by a ﬁxed amount).
Finally, from the standpoint of the theory of optimal contracts, this paper intro-
duces and studies a new class of principal agent problems, with stochastic monitoring
of the agent’s portfolio not otherwise observable. This class of problems has a wide
range of applications that we do not explicitly explore in this paper. Nonetheless,
we will mention here that one interesting and ﬁtting application is to the study of
credit markets where a borrower (the agent) has access to a primary lender (the
principal), as well as to a secondary market for credit, and hence his total liabilities
are not observable. In this context the stochastic monitoring technology represents
the institution of bankruptcy, and a fundamental component of the optimal contract
would consist in designing such an institution.13
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 studies the one period case, where ﬁrms
have cash ﬂow and managers get compensated at only one point in time. Most of the
intuition and main results can be obtained in this case. Section 3 extends the analysis
to two periods, which introduces intertemporal considerations. We also discuss the
case where managers have access to risk free borrowing and lending only and show
that most of our results carry over to this case. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are
in the Appendix.
13Bisin and Rampini (2004) study bankruptcy in a related environment, but without an explicit
stochastic monitoring technology.
52 Managerial Incentive Compensation and Port-
folio Monitoring: Static Case
Our analysis will be developed in the context of a simple standard agency environ-
ment with hidden eﬀort (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart (1983)). A (risk neutral)
principal owns a production process, whose outcome is uncertain, and has to hire a
(risk averse) agent to manage it. The agent’s eﬀort level in this task is not observable
and aﬀects the probability distribution of the process’ outcome.
In this paper the principal and the agent are, respectively, the shareholders (or
the board) and the manager of a ﬁrm. We study the optimal incentive compensation
contract shareholders can write to align their objective with that of the manager
when his eﬀort is not observable and when i) the manager can engage in trades in
ﬁnancial markets to hedge his risk, which may adversely aﬀect his incentives, and ii)
shareholders can only imperfectly monitor the manager’s trades in ﬁnancial markets.
We consider ﬁrst the case where there is a single period where production and
payments take place. In the following section the analysis will be extended to allow
for more production and payment dates.
The manager and the shareholders. Let S = {H,L}, with generic element s,
describe the possible realizations of the uncertainty. The cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm is yH
in state H and yL in state L, with yH >y L > 0. The probability of each state s ∈ S
depends on the eﬀort level e ∈{ a,b} undertaken by the manager and is denoted
πs(e).
The shareholders’ income coincides with the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow, less the compensa-
tion paid to the manager. We assume that shareholders are risk neutral (for instance
because the risk of the ﬁrm is idiosyncratic and can be fully diversiﬁed by sharehold-
ers). On the other hand, the manager is risk averse. We assume he has no resources
other than his ability to work and has Von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences deﬁned
over his level of consumption (equal to the compensation received) in every state as




More precisely, we require the utility index u(.) to satisfy the following:
Assumption 1 u : R+→ R is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and limz→0 u0(z)=
∞.
The last part of the assumption implies that the manager’s compensation has to
ensure him a strictly positive level of income in every state.
6The term v(e) in the manager’s utility function describes his disutility for eﬀort.
We assume that v(a) >v (b) > 0 and πH(a) >π H(b). Thus, a should be viewed as
the high eﬀort level, which entails a larger disutility but also a higher probability for
state H, in which the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow is larger.
The realization of the uncertainty, that is, of s, is commonly observed. However,
the eﬀort undertaken by the manager is his private information and cannot be mon-
itored. As usual, we will assume that the gains from eliciting high eﬀort are always
suﬃciently big relative to its cost, v(a) − v(b), so that in designing the optimal con-
tract we face a non-trivial incentive problem. In particular, we will assume that the
manager, when his compensation equals the ﬁrm’s entire cash ﬂow, prefers to exert
high eﬀort rather than low eﬀort even when he has the opportunity to fully hedge
his risk (at prices π(b), fair contingent on low eﬀort):
Assumption 2 The manager’s preferences u(.) and the parameters v(e),π(e) are
such that
πH(a)u(yH)+πL(a)u(yL) − v(a) >u(πH(b)yH + πL(b)yL) − v(b).
Markets. The manager and the shareholders have access to competitive ﬁnancial
markets where they can trade, at the beginning of the period, claims contingent on
each possible realization of the uncertainty. In particular the manager can trade any
derivative contract on the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow, thereby hedging any incentive component
of his compensation. Since the probability distribution of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow depends
on the manager’s eﬀort, such derivative markets are characterized by the presence of
moral hazard.
We consider here the case where the contracts traded in these markets are non
exclusive, that is, the case in which a dealer trading with a manager does not know
whether the manager engages in other trades in the market. This is in accordance
with the ﬂexible institutional setting of these markets: managers can trade diﬀerent
contracts with diﬀerent investment banks, as well as construct basket hedges or
simply trade using family members’ accounts.14 Hence, the price of these contracts
cannot depend on the manager’s total portfolio (since nobody except the manager
observes it), though they may vary with the sign of the transaction. It follows from
the analysis in Bisin and Gottardi (1999) that equilibrium prices in the ﬁnancial
markets exhibit the following properties: the price of a hedging contract (that is,
a purchase of insurance) is fair conditionally on low eﬀort being exerted, i.e., it is
14For an analysis of the optimal incentive compensation when managers can hedge (without any
monitoring) in ﬁnancial markets via the trade of a single - exclusive - contract, see Garvey (1993) and
Ozerturk (2003). However, this assumes that contracts traded in the hedging market exhibit stronger
enforceability properties than the compensation contract itself, which seems counterintuitive, and
implies that it should be optimal to have non-zero trade in the hedging market.
7additive with respect to state prices p+
s = πs(b),s∈ S; the price for bets on the
ﬁrm (sales of insurance) is on the other hand fair conditionally on high eﬀort being
exerted, that is, with respect to state prices p−
s = πs(a),s∈ S. This speciﬁcation of
the prices reﬂects the fact that, at the optimal contract, if the manager hedges in the
market, he will have no incentives to choose the high eﬀort. The price will therefore
take this into account, and hedging will be more costly (in particular, fair conditional
on low eﬀort). Betting on the ﬁrm’s performance, in contrast, will not induce the
manager to switch from the high eﬀort level, and hence the price for selling insurance
will be low.
At these prices, a dealer trading a derivative contract on the stock of the manager’s
ﬁrm makes zero-proﬁts by perfectly hedging such risk in the market.15 One may think
that the dealer might be able to hedge this risk at a lower cost by selling short the
ﬁrm’s equity (whose market value is determined at the state prices πs(a)). The
possibility of doing so is however severely limited when the depth of the market for
the ﬁrm’s equity is small, since news about such transactions quickly spreads across
investors and analysts.16 Moreover, it would be in the manager’s interest to require
the dealer not to hedge his trades by shorting the ﬁrm’s equity if such transactions
are easily detected. With a deep equity market the dealer may be able to lower his
hedging cost by shorting equity, but this is only possible to a limited extent, due to
the lack of liquidity of short-sales markets, and only for smaller trades: the price at
which managers can hedge their compensation will then still be higher than its fair
price with respect to state prices πs(a) and will also increase in the amount of trades.
Therefore, while the speciﬁcation of state prices for hedging trades we consider, given
by πs(b), should be viewed as more appropriate for situations where the depth of the
market for the ﬁrm’s equity is limited, our analysis and results can be extended to
other cases, where hedges are more costly than if priced at state prices πs(a) and less
costly than if priced at πs(b).
Monitoring. As is well known, whether or not the agent’s trades in the market
are observable by the principal plays an important role in the determination of the
optimal contract between the two parties in the presence of asymmetric information.
If not detected, such trades may in fact undo the incentives provided by the contract.
We examine the case where a monitoring technology may be used to detect the
manager’s trades in ﬁnancial markets. Monitoring takes place ex post, i.e., not
15Moreover the ﬁnancial market is arbitrage free, since the prices for purchases of state-contingent
claims, πH(a) and πL(b), exceed the prices for sales, πH(b) and πL(a), for both states. In general,
the viability of a competitive market in the presence of informational asymmetries requires that
traders with private information (in our case, the manager) face a bid ask spread, or that a diﬀerent
price is charged for purchases and sales; see Bisin and Gottardi (1999).
16In Bolster, Chance, and Rich (1996)’s case study, for instance, the market discounted the
performance and signaling eﬀect of managerial hedging before the transaction was disclosed to the
SEC; see also Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000).
8when trades are actually made (at the beginning of the period), but rather when the
payments associated with such trades are made (at the end of the period) in a given
state.
The intensity of monitoring in each state s will be measured by the probability
ms with which the payments due to or from the manager in state s are observed.
Monitoring is costly and hence will be imperfect. More precisely, we assume that the
cost of exerting monitoring in each state s with intensity ms is given by φ(¯ m), where
¯ m =
P
s∈S πs(a)ms and φ is a positive and increasing function of ¯ m.
Furthermore, we need to specify which punishment can be inﬂicted on the man-
ager if he is found to have traded in the ﬁnancial markets. We assume the punishment
can only take a monetary form. Given the above speciﬁcation of the monitoring tech-
nology it seems natural to consider the case where punishments consist in the seizure
of the payments due to the manager from his trades in the ﬁnancial market. Thus, if
the manager is monitored in state s, all the payoﬀs of any hedging transactions that
are due to him in this state will be seized, while the manager will still have to make
all the payments due from him for his hedging trades. We also discuss the case where
additional penalties, e.g., an additional monetary penalty of size k, can be imposed
on the manager and show that our main results extend to this case (see Section 2.3).
2.1 The Contracting Problem
We are now ready to describe the optimal contracting problem between the manager
and the shareholders in this framework. A contract speciﬁes the compensation due
to the manager in every contingency that is commonly observable to the parties: the
ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow realization and whether or not monitoring occurs. The contract also
speciﬁes the monitoring probabilities in each of the possible realizations of the ﬁrm’s
cash ﬂow. Finally, the contract contains a recommendation of a level of eﬀort and of
trades in ﬁnancial markets.
The level of trades in ﬁnancial markets can be set equal to zero without any loss
of generality, since the outcome of any trade can always be replicated by appropriate
changes in the net payments. In practice, of course, ﬁrms might have incentives to
design compensation packages composed mostly of equity derivatives, e.g., of stock
options because of their advantageous tax treatment (see Murphy (1999)), and then
let the manager hedge his compensation in part in the market. In this case, the
managerial hedging transaction that are observed in practice might be explicitly or
implicitly part of the ﬁrms’ compensation packages.
We will ﬁrst characterize the properties of the optimal compensation scheme for
any given monitoring probabilities (mH,m L), and then discuss the determination
of the optimal level of monitoring when monitoring costs are explicitly taken into
account. Let then znm(e)=( znm
H (e),znm
L (e)) ∈ R2
+ (respectively, zm(e) ∈ R2
+)
denote the payment to the manager in each state when no monitoring (respectively,
9monitoring) occurs and eﬀort e is recommended. Under Assumption 2, as we will
see, shareholders are always able to implement a high level of eﬀort e = a by the
manager, whatever is (mH,m L), and this is optimal. As a consequence, to keep the
notation simpler in what follows, whenever possible, we will avoid to explicitly write
the dependence of z on e.
The optimal compensation contract for the manager in the presence of moral
hazard and random monitoring of side trades, when monitoring occurs in the two
states with probability mH and mL, respectively, is then obtained as a solution of
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s − max{τs,0})] − v(e
0) (2)
for all e0 ∈{ a,b}, {(τH,−τL) ∈ R2
+ :
P
s∈{H,L} πs(b)τs =0 }, {(−τH,τ L) ∈ R2
+ : P
s∈{H,L} πs(a)τs =0 }.
This program requires maximizing the manager’s utility subject to the sharehold-
ers’ participation constraint, given by (1), and the incentive compatibility constraint
(2). We choose this approach rather than to maximize the shareholders expected
utility subject to a participation constraint for the manager since it simpliﬁes the
analysis without aﬀecting the results. The term appearing on the left hand side of
(1) is the shareholders’ expected utility (equivalently expected net income, given the
shareholders’ risk neutrality) when compensation (zm,znm) is paid to the manager
in the various states. On the right hand side the shareholders’ reservation utility is
set at zero.17 The participation constraint amounts to setting an upper bound on
the expected payments to the manager.
Equation (2) describes the incentive constraints in our set-up, where both eﬀort
and trades in ﬁnancial markets are private information of the manager. It requires
the manager to be unable to achieve a higher utility level not only by choosing a
diﬀerent eﬀort level (b), but also by engaging in some trades (τH,τ L) 6=0 . We adopt
17This is without loss of generality since cash ﬂows can always be redeﬁned to be net of a ﬁxed
payment to shareholders.
10the convention that a negative value of τs denotes the purchase of a claim (contingent
on state s), and hence the right to receive a payment in state s. Thus, in the event of
monitoring, no payment is received. On the other hand, when τs > 0, the manager
has to make a payment τs whether or not monitoring occurs. Thus trades such that
τH > 0,τ L < 0 correspond to the purchase of insurance and are priced at πs(b), while
trades such that τH < 0,τ L > 0 correspond to the sale of insurance and are priced at
πs(a). Note that the agent faces no restriction in his trades in the ﬁnancial markets
except his budget constraint; hence any self-ﬁnancing trade is admissible.18
Since the manager is risk averse and shareholders risk neutral, the solution of
(PMON) yields the compensation scheme with minimal risk that is compatible with
incentives. The tightness of the incentives, and hence the speciﬁc form of the com-
pensation, depends, as we will see, on the values of (mH,m L).
2.2 The Optimal Contract
We provide here a characterization of the solution of the optimal contracting problem
described in the previous section. We ﬁrst determine in which of the states (i.e., for
which realizations of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow) monitoring should optimally occur. Next,
we characterize the manager’s optimal compensation scheme.
2.2.1 When should monitoring occur?
Our ﬁrst result shows that the optimal contract does not depend on the monitoring
probability in the high state, mH.19
Proposition 1 The optimal contract (that is, the solution of (PMON)) is indepen-
dent of mH.
From this it follows that, if monitoring is costly, as we assume, it should never occur
in state H, but only in state L, that is, when the realized cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm is
low. Thus we can always set mH = 0 and, to simplify the notation, m ≡ mL. We
will henceforth consider the contracting problem as a function of m.
2.2.2 Optimal compensation
In this section we characterize the optimal compensation scheme z(m)=( zH(m),znm
L (m),zm
L (m))
for any m, 0 ≤ m ≤ 1. We consider ﬁrst two benchmark cases: (i) perfect observ-
18With the above formulation of the trading constraints in the primary markets managers never
choose to engage in side trades. Hence there is no need to specify what happens to the payments
seized from them since no payments are ever seized.
19This is not necessarily true if other forms of punishment than the seizure of the payments due
for side trades were allowed. But see the discussion of alternative punishments below.
11ability of trades/perfect monitoring (m = 1); (ii) non-observability of trades/no
monitoring (m = 0).
If monitoring takes place with probability m = 1, trades are perfectly observable.
In this case the manager is unable to proﬁt from any trade in the ﬁnancial market
(since their proceeds will be seized with certainty). We can support then the incentive
eﬃcient (or second best) contract (z∗
H,z∗






πs(a)u(zs) − v(a)( PSB)
subject to X
s∈{H,L}
πs(a)[ys − zs] ≥ 0, (3)
and X
s∈{H,L}
πs(a)u(zs) − v(a) ≥
X
s∈{H,L}
πs(b)u(zs) − v(b), (4)
where in the incentive compatibility constraint (4) we are only checking for devia-
tions concerning the eﬀort level, and the compensation only depends on the realized
state.20 The solution of PSB is given by the values of zH,z L satisfying (3) and (4) as
equalities.21
On the other hand, if m = 0, shareholders are unable to do any monitoring of
the manager’s trades. Thus the manager can always engage in trades in ﬁnancial
markets without any risk of being detected. It is easy to see that in this case the
best the manager can do by trading in the market is to fully insure (at the price π(b))
against the ﬂuctuations in his income (and in that case he would switch to low eﬀort).
Under Assumption 2 the high level of eﬀort can still be implemented in this case; the
optimal compensation scheme is then the one that makes the manager just indiﬀerent
between making such trades and not making them (incentive compatibility), i.e.,
πH(a)u(zH)+πL(a)u(z
nm
L ) − v(a)=u(πH(b)zH + πL(b)z
nm
L ) − v(b) (5)
and satisﬁes the participation constraint (3) as equality.22 We will denote by (zH(0),znm
L (0))
the solution of (3), (5) describing the optimal compensation scheme when m =0 .
The incentive constraint is now clearly more restrictive and we can easily show that
the optimal compensation is characterized by a higher level of risk than when trades
20When there is no uncertainty over monitoring, i.e., when m =1o rm = 0, the participation
constraint (1) simpliﬁes as in (3).
21Under our assumption that preferences are separable in consumption and eﬀort, it is known,
see, e.g., Bennardo and Chiappori (2003), that at any incentive eﬃcient allocation the participation
constraint binds.
22For suﬃcient conditions implying that the participation constraint binds in this case, see
Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
12are fully observable (i.e., at the second best (z∗
H,z∗
L) the manager’s compensation is
less steep):23
Proposition 2 Comparing the optimal compensation scheme with no monitoring













L (0)) and (z∗
H,z∗
L) are characterized, as we said, by the same expected
value of the payments to the manager, we conclude that the variance of the manager’s
compensation is higher with zero than with full monitoring of his trades.
We proceed now to the characterization of the optimal compensation scheme for
any given intermediate value of m ∈ (0,1). When m = 1, as we saw, both the
incentive and the participation constraints hold as equality at an optimum so that,
since there are only two states, the optimal compensation in each state is simply
obtained by solving these constraints. In fact, we can show that, whatever m is,
at an optimum contract the incentive constraint still holds as equality (Lemma 2 in
the Appendix) and provide some suﬃcient conditions for the participation constraint
to also bind (Lemma 3 in the Appendix). We will assume in what follows that the
participation constraint binds.
To characterize the level of steepness that is required in the manager’s compen-
sation to satisfy incentive compatibility, we have to determine the maximum utility
the manager can attain, for any given compensation z, by switching to low eﬀort and
hedging his risk in the market. This is the maximal value of the term on the right
hand side of the inequality in the incentive compatibility condition (2). As argued in
the proof of Proposition 1 (since at the optimal compensation scheme the manager
can never gain by selling insurance and maintaining a high eﬀort level), it suﬃces







L )+( 1− m)u(z
nm
L − τL)] − v(b)
such that
P
s∈{H,L} πs(b)τs =0 .
Its ﬁrst order conditions are:
u











23Garvey (1993) studies a similar problem with continuous eﬀort choice.
13Therefore, if
u




(i.e., if zH is considerably larger than znm
L ), the maximal utility (by deviating to low
eﬀort) is attained with a non-zero level of trade in the market, while if
u




the manager prefers not to engage in trades in the market.
On this basis we can easily show that if the probability of monitoring m is suﬃ-
ciently high (though less than 1), the optimal contract is the same as the one with
perfect observability of trades (m = 1):
Proposition 3 Let m∗ ≡ 1−u0(z∗
H)/u0(z∗
L) < 1. Then, for any m ≥ m∗, the second
best contract z∗
H,z∗
L can be implemented (satisﬁes (2)) and hence constitutes the





To better understand this ﬁnding, notice that by trading in the market the man-
ager can freely transfer income from state H to state L when no monitoring occurs
(he is obviously unable to transfer income to state L when monitoring occurs since
all the proceeds from any trade will be seized). The relative price at which such a
transfer can occur is
πL(b)
πH(b) while the odds of these states are
πL(b)(1−m)
πH(b) . Thus moni-
toring implies that the manager can hedge (some of) his risk but at a price which is
less than fair. When m is suﬃciently close to 1, the cost of hedging becomes so high
that the manager prefers not to do any of it.
For any m<m ∗ the second best contract is not implementable: the manager
can in fact attain a higher utility by switching to low eﬀort and making non-zero
trades in the market than by exerting high eﬀort. To sustain incentives the optimal
compensation scheme will hence have to depart from z∗, but in which direction? A
ﬁrst answer is provided by the following:







and, if the manager were to deviate to low eﬀort, he would choose to buy insurance,
τH > 0,
This result shows that, when the manager wishes to engage in side trades, it is
optimal to condition his compensation on whether or not monitoring occurs. To gain
some intuition on this, notice ﬁrst that the contract must provide incentives to exert
high eﬀort: the compensation in the high state has to be suﬃciently higher than
the compensation in the low state. But the contract must also provide incentives
14not to engage in trades in the market. Such trades, as we said, allow the manager
to transfer income from the high state to the low state when monitoring does not
occur. Hence the possibility to engage in these trades will be more valuable to the
manager the larger is the diﬀerence between his income in these two states, zH and
znm
L . On the other hand, his compensation in the low state when monitoring does
occur, zm
L , plays no role for this. As a consequence, by setting znm
L relatively high we
can enhance the manager’s incentives not to engage in side trades and can sustain
his incentive to exert high eﬀort with a suﬃciently low level of zm
L .
Remark 1 It is interesting to point out that the property znm
L (m) >z m
L (m) we ﬁnd
is in contrast to the ﬁnding in the costly state veriﬁcation literature that the agent
is rewarded if he is monitored and did tell the truth (see in particular Lemma 2 in
Mookherjee and Png (1989)). In our model, when the agent is monitored his com-
pensation is low even if he did nothing wrong. The critical diﬀerence is that in our
model there is a link between the compensation of the manager when he is monitored
and found not to have engaged in hedging trades, given by zm
L , and the compensa-
tion when he is monitored and did engage in such trades, which is zm
L − max{τL,0}.
Reducing zm
L relative to znm
L increases the cost in utility terms of the seizure of the
payoﬀs from the hedging trades and thus increases the penalty for hedging. Further-
more, increasing znm
L relative to zm
L reduces the beneﬁts of hedging since the agent
would enjoy these in state L when he is not monitored in which case he would con-
sume znm
L − τL. In the standard costly state veriﬁcation model in contrast there is
no link between what the agent gets paid when he is monitored and announced the
cash ﬂow truthfully and what he is paid when he is monitored and found to have
understated the cash ﬂow. Mookherjee and Png (1989) for example assume that
the agent is paid 0 in that case. Without a link between the compensation when a
deviation is detected and when monitoring occurs and no deviation is detected, it is
then optimal to reward the agent when he is monitored and no deviation occurred.
His compensation in that state aﬀects only the objective and the left hand side of the
incentive compatibility constraint, whereas the compensation when he is not moni-
tored also aﬀects the right hand side of the incentive compatibility constraint, i.e.,
the agent’s incentives to understate cash ﬂow. The analysis of alternative speciﬁca-
tions of penalties in the next Section provides additional discussion of this point.
Also, while it is often observed that, to exert monitoring after the agent’s action has
been made, the principal has to credibly commit to do so ex ante, in our set-up this
is less of a problem. This is because at an optimum the compensation paid to the
agent/manager is lower when monitoring is exerted, and this may prove a suﬃcient
incentive for the principal to indeed be willing to monitor, if the cost of doing so is
not too high.24
24We owe this observation to Sonje Reiche.
15Example 1 Consider the case in which the manager has logarithmic preferences,
i.e., u(zs)=l n zs. In this case, we can explicitly compute the level of trade τH the
manager would choose if he were to undertake low eﬀort when his compensation is









. Note that τH varies linearly with z and is larger the
larger the diﬀerence between zH and znm
L (i.e., the larger the gains from insurance).
Consider then the following parameter values: yH =5 /4, yL =1 /4, πH(a)=3 /4,
πH(b)=1 /4, v(a)=1 /4, and v(b)=0 . The manager’s optimal compensation for
diﬀerent values of m are reported in Panel A of Table 1 and in Figure 1. The opti-
mal compensation with perfect observability (z∗
H,z∗
L) (dotted) lies between the optimal
compensation with no monitoring (zH(0),z L(0)) (dashed), and thus the compensation
contract is steeper without monitoring (see Proposition 2). The solid line graphs the
compensation contract (zH(m),znm
L (m),zm
L (m)) as a function of m. When the moni-
toring probability exceeds m∗ ≈ 39%, the compensation schedule is as if hedging were
perfectly observable (see Proposition 3). Moreover, the manager’s utility increases
monotonically as m is increased from 0 to m∗. Also, the steepness in the manager’s
compensation decreases as m rises; in particular the compensation in the good state
H goes down while the one in the bad state L when monitoring occurs goes up. On the
other hand, in this example the compensation in state L when no monitoring occurs
varies non-monotonically with m:a sm → 0, znm
L (m) → znm
L (0) <z ∗
L, but for m
close to but less than m∗, znm
L (m) is even higher than the second best level z∗
L. Here,
the eﬀect that higher znm
L (m) reduces the incentives to hedge dominates. Finally, for
all m<m ∗, znm
L is strictly greater than zm
L (which is optimal as we argued since it
reduces the manager’s incentive to engage in hedging activity; see Proposition 4).
We have studied so far the optimal contracting problem for given monitoring
probability m. By introducing the consideration of monitoring costs the optimal
intensity of monitoring can also be determined.
Let V (m) denote the manager’s expected utility at the optimal contract z(m),
obtained as a solution of (PMON) for given m. We can show that this value is
increasing in m:
Proposition 5 V (m) is strictly increasing in m, for m<m ∗.
The optimal level of m is then obtained as the solution of the following problem:
max
m V (m) − φ(πL(a)m).
In fact, assuming the cost function φ(·) is not only increasing but also suﬃciently
convex, the optimal level of m is uniquely determined.
162.3 Alternative Speciﬁcation of Penalties
So far we have restricted attention to environments where the only penalty is the
seizure of payoﬀs of side trades which the manager is due to receive. While this spec-
iﬁcation is consistent with the limited disclosure requirements and with the limited
case law, as we argued in the Introduction, harsher penalties would clearly be valu-
able. In this section we extend our analysis to consider an alternative speciﬁcation in
which a reduction in the pay to the manager can be imposed when he is monitored
and caught hedging.25
Suppose, more speciﬁcally, that the manager’s pay can be reduced by a given
amount k if managerial hedging is detected, so that he consumes zm
s −k−max{τs,0}
in that case. It turns out that all of our results still obtain in this case, which we
show in part within the set-up of the example considered earlier numerically and in
part more generally.
To show that monitoring in the low state only is optimal, we take the uncon-
ditional monitoring probability, say ¯ m, as given, and assume that the monitoring
probability in the two states is chosen optimally subject to the constraint that
πH(a)mH + πL(a)mL ≤ ¯ m.
We ﬁnd, within the set-up of Example 1, that it is still optimal to set mH = 0 (and
hence mL =¯ m/πL(a)). The intuition is as follows. Since compensation in state L
is lower than in state H, the penalty k is larger in utility terms in state L and thus
monitoring occurs in state L only. Moreover, since managerial hedging pays oﬀ in
state L and such payoﬀs can be seized, this is another reason why the manager’s
portfolio is monitored in state L (indeed, this is the intuition for Proposition 1).
Example 1 (Continued) Consider the same environment of Example 1 but assume
that monetary penalties of size k can be imposed for hedging (in addition to the
seizure of all payoﬀs of hedging activity). When k =0we obtain then the situation
of Example 1 as a special case (thus the dotted, dash-dotted, and solid line are as in
Figure 1). In the numerical computation of this example, we allow monitoring to take
place in both states with mH,m L chosen subject to the constraint that πH(a)mH +
πL(a)mL ≤ ¯ m. We ﬁnd that mH =0 , i.e., that monitoring occurs in state L only
and hence that mH =0is still optimal, even if k is positive.
In Figure 2 the optimal compensation is then again plotted as a function of m ≡
mL =¯ m/πL(a), for three values of k: 0 (which, as we argued, corresponds to the case
discussed previously), 0.02 (dash-dotted line), and 0.05 (bold dotted line). Consider
25Yet another possible speciﬁcation would include penalties imposed on the investment banks
oﬀering derivative hedging contracts to managers. In practice, though, legitimate reasons for the
managers to hedge might exist, and requiring investment banks to monitor the managers’ motiva-
tions for trading may then not be optimal.
17the optimal compensation for k =0 .05, which is the bold dotted line in the ﬁgure.
First, note that the compensation is only graphed for m less than approximately 14%.
When m is higher than that, the compensation contract is equivalent to the case of
perfect observability. In the previous case (i.e., with k =0 ), this only occurs for m>
m∗ ≈ 39%, i.e., much higher levels of monitoring were required for the compensation
contract to be equivalent to perfect observability. The additional penalty imposed by
k>0 clearly improves matters. When m is less than 14%, the compensation contract
varies with m in a similar fashion as before (with k =0 ), but the diﬀerence between
znm
L and zm
L , which is again positive, is in fact larger: the compensation when the
manager is monitored is reduced further (when k>0) since this gives the monetary
penalty k additional bite. Note also that at m ≈ 14% there is a discontinuity in the
compensation, which jumps to the perfect observability contract; this is due to the
fact that there is a penalty of ﬁxed size here.
With k =0 .02, a monitoring probability of at least 21% is required for the manager’s
access to hedging markets not to aﬀect the compensation contract (i.e., for the second
best contract to be implementable). Otherwise the results are comparable.
In the Example we have also seen that, except for the fact that the minimum
level of monitoring needed to implement the second best contract is now lower and
the compensation is discontinuous at that point, the optimal compensation with
k>0 exhibits similar features to those found when k = 0, in particular the property
znm
L ≥ zm
L is still valid. We can show that this property has general validity:
Lemma 1 If an additional penalty in the form of a salary reduction of size k is
imposed when hedging is detected, the optimal contract is such that znm
L ≥ zm
L , with
strict inequality when the optimal deviation is characterized by τH > 0.
Moreover, this result - as well as the previous ﬁndings - remains valid even if we
assume that the payoﬀs of managerial hedging cannot be seized (in which case the
only penalty for hedging is a reduction of salary of size k, so that the manager would
get zm
L − τL − k in state L when monitored and hedging is detected). As already
argued in Remark 1, what is essential for the result is that there is a link between
what the manager gets paid when he is monitored and did nothing wrong and what
he gets paid when hedging is detected. In the presence of such link, paying the
manager more when he is not monitored reduces the beneﬁts of hedging and paying
him less when he is monitored increases the penalty in utility terms if caught having
traded.
On the other hand, if we were to consider the case where the penalty consists in re-
ducing the compensation of the manager down to a minimum level K, independently
of what the compensation promised to the manager in state L was (analogously to
Mookherjee and Png (1989)),26 our results could be overturned.
26In their case K = 0, but their problem is still not trivial since they assume u(0) = 0 > −∞.
183 Managerial Compensation with Portfolio Mon-
itoring: Intertemporal Case
This section extends the analysis of the contracting problem to an intertemporal
framework, where there is output (and consumption) at two possible dates, date 0
and date 1. The ﬁrm produces a deterministic cash ﬂow at date 0, given by y0 > 0,
and a random cash ﬂow at date 1, again taking values yH and yL with probability
dependent on the manager’s eﬀort level. The manager and shareholders have a
common discount factor, equal to one. The manager’s preferences over his income at
date 0 and date 1 in every possible state are: u(z0)+
P
s∈{H,L} πs(e)u(zs) − v(e).
The interest of the extension lies in the fact that, in this set-up, the optimal in-
centive contract has implications regarding the optimal distribution of the manager’s
compensation over time. We ﬁnd that, relative to the case where managers cannot
hedge, their compensation is shifted from date 0 to date 1. In fact, as shown by
Rogerson (1985), in an intertemporal agency problem with hidden action, when no
side trades are possible, at the optimal contract the time proﬁle of the compensation
is distorted in favor of the initial period - i.e., exhibits front loading - as this allows
to improve incentives; as a consequence, the agent would want to save (if he had the
option to do so). When the manager has access to hedging markets, shareholders
face some limitations in the extent by which they can distort the time proﬁle of the
manager’s compensation. The characterization of the optimal contract parallels oth-
erwise the one in the case without date 0 consumption: monitoring occurs in state
L, the manager bears more risk, and his compensation in state L is higher when he
is not monitored than when he is monitored.27
In an intertemporal framework we have to distinguish between the case in which
the manager can make side trades in a complete set of contingent claims, so that he
is free to borrow and lend as well as to insure against any possible ﬂuctuation in his
compensation, and the case in which the manager’s side trades are restricted to risk
free borrowing and lending. We examine both cases in turn.
3.1 Hedging Incentive Compensation with Contingent Claims
Suppose the manager (and shareholders) have access to ﬁnancial markets where, at
date 0, claims contingent on any state s ∈ S can be traded. As in the previous
section, markets are anonymous and competitive: agents face a given unit price,
which may diﬀer for purchases and sales, at which they are free to choose the level
of their trades.
27Park (2004) considers a similar environment in which the agent’s date 0 consumption and
savings decision is not observable and is taken prior to contracting. He concludes that only low
eﬀort is implementable.
19Equilibrium prices are the same as before: for purchases of claims contingent on
the L state and sales of claims contingent on the H state (corresponding to hedging
trades) they are fair conditional on low eﬀort, p
+
L = πL(b), p
+
H = πH(b), while for sales
of claims contingent on L and purchases of claims contingent on H (that correspond to
betting on the ﬁrm) they are fair conditional on high eﬀort, p
−
L = πL(a), p
−
H = πH(a).
Under Assumption 2 the optimal compensation scheme again implements high eﬀort
and we will show that, at the above prices, the manager does not wish to engage in
trades in the ﬁnancial market.
Note that the above expressions for the equilibrium prices now also implies that










L) − 1=1 /(πH(a)+πL(b)) − 1 < 0. Thus there is a positive spread not
only for the trade of each contingent claim, but also for the trade of a claim with a
riskless payoﬀ.
In what follows, we will focus our attention on the case where monitoring only
takes place at date 1, not at date 0. This is primarily for simplicity and will make the
comparison with the results for the one period model easier. In this case, we are able
to show (see Lemma 4 in the Appendix) a result analogous to Proposition 1, i.e., that
exerting monitoring only in state L is optimal. This obviously does not mean that
if monitoring could also be exerted at date 0, this would necessarily be redundant.
However, the substance of our results would not be aﬀected if monitoring at date
0 were allowed and, moreover, monitoring in state L is most eﬀective since, as we
will show, the manager’s compensation is lowest in that state and hence monetary
penalties (seizing hedging payoﬀs or additional penalties as in Section 2.3) have the
largest eﬀect on utility.
We will show that the optimal compensation scheme for the manager in this two-
period framework, when monitoring of side trades is random and occurs only in state
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for all e0 ∈{ a,b} and (τ0,τ H,τ L) ∈T(b), where T (b) ≡{ τ0,(τH,−τL) ∈ R × R
2
+ :
τ0 +πH(b)τH +πL(b)τL =0 } is the set of trades in ﬁnancial markets that are budget
20feasible and are restricted to be only purchases of insurance, i.e., sales of H claims
and purchases of L claims.28
In problem P0
MON we imposed two additional restrictions on the contracting prob-
lem: we required monitoring to take place only in state L, not in H, and required
trades to lie in T (b). Lemma 4 in the Appendix shows that neither of these restric-
tions is binding and hence that a solution of problem P0
MON indeed gives the optimal
compensation scheme when the manager is free to choose both to sell as well as
to purchase insurance in the market for contingent claims at the prices p+ and p−
described above, and when monitoring occurs in both states at date 1.
Let Z(m) ≡ [z0(m),z H(m),znm
L (m),zm
L (m)] denote the solution of problem P0
MON.
By the previous argument this deﬁnes the optimal compensation paid to the manager
in each date and in every contingency. Whenever it is possible without generating
confusion, the dependence on m will be omitted.
In what follows we will examine how diﬀerent levels of ability to monitor the
manager’s trades of contingent claims aﬀect the optimal contract. The focus will be
primarily on the distribution of the compensation over time (between date 0 and 1);
the eﬀects on the steepness of the compensation (its variability between the H and
the L state) are - qualitatively - similar to the one found in the previous section, as
we will see.
To characterize the optimal contract it is useful, as in the previous section, to
begin with the two extreme cases where there is no monitoring, i.e., m = 0, and
where there is perfect monitoring in state L, i.e., m = 1. Note that, since we ruled
out by assumption the possibility of exerting monitoring at date 0, the case m =1
no longer corresponds to the second best (incentive eﬃcient) contract, but rather to




u(z0)+πH(a)u(zH)+πL(a)u(zL) − v(a)( P0
SBc)
subject to
(y0 − z0)+πH(a)(yH − zH)+πL(a)(yL − zL) ≥ 0
and










+ πL(b)u(zL) − v(b). (10)
Since trades in state L are fully monitored, and payoﬀs seized, the manager will
never engage in such trades: τL ≡ 0 (hence znm
L = zm
L ≡ zL). On the other hand,
the manager will now still be able to sell, unmonitored, claims contingent on H,
28These are the trades for which prices are given by π(b), i.e., are fair conditional on low eﬀort
being exerted.
21and will then optimally use this opportunity to perfectly smooth his income between
state H and date 0, as in (10) above. Let us denote a solution of problem P0
SBc






L] and the income at date 0 and in state H under the optimal










We can show (all results are formally stated and proved in the Appendix) that the
optimal compensation with no monitoring Z(0) is characterized by perfect intertem-
poral smoothing (u0(z0(0)) = πH(a)u0(zH(0)) + πL(a)u0(znm
L (0))), while the one with
full monitoring (in state L) is distorted in favor of the initial period, i.e., exhibits
front loading: u0(z+
0 ) <π H(a)u0(z+
H)+πL(a)u0(z+
L). As mentioned earlier, the latter
property (i.e., the presence of front loading) was established by Rogerson (1985) for
the case where no side trades are possible. Our result shows that this is also true
when side trades are restricted to take place only in some markets, those for the H
claims.
Moreover, as in the static case, incentives are steeper, and the compensation in
state H larger, with no monitoring compared to the case of full monitoring and, if
u000 > 0, the compensation at date 0 is lower with no monitoring (as we argued in
this case there is no front loading) than with full monitoring.29
Consider then the case of imperfect monitoring, m ∈ (0,1). We ﬁnd again that,
as long as the probability of monitoring m is suﬃciently high, the optimal contract
with imperfect monitoring is the same as with full monitoring (in state L). When the
probability of monitoring is not suﬃciently high (so that the optimal contract with
full monitoring is no longer implementable), the optimal compensation scheme is such
that the compensation is higher in state L in the event of no monitoring than when
monitoring occurs and, if the manager were to trade in the ﬁnancial markets, he would
choose to buy insurance, τL < 0. Also, for all m we have zH(m) >z 0(m) >z nm
L (m).
Example 2 Modify the environment of Example 1 by introducing date 0 consumption
and a date 0 endowment of y0 =1 /4. The values of the optimal compensation in this
case are reported in Panel B of Table 1 and in Figure 3. In this example, m+ ≈ 35%
so that this monitoring intensity is suﬃcient to get managers to refrain from hedging
their compensation in state L. Furthermore, note that while the compensation with
perfect monitoring in state L only, Z+, and the compensation with perfect monitoring
in both states, Z∗, do not coincide, they are almost indistinguishable; this suggests
that the manager’s main concern is to insure against his low income in state L at
date 1. Once this is prevented by monitoring in that state, the compensation contract
looks almost identical to the optimal compensation when there is perfect observability
of trades. Also, note that the manager’s compensation at date 0, z0(m), increases as
29It is possible to show that exactly the same properties established in Proposition 6 in the
Appendix hold when the optimal compensation scheme with no monitoring, Z(0), is compared to
the optimal compensation scheme with full monitoring in all markets (also at date 0), i.e., to the
incentive eﬃcient (second best) contract Z∗. The proof is similar and is hence omitted.
22m increases: the higher m is, the more front loading of the compensation is possible.
The other aspects of the characterization parallel the ones of Example 1.
3.2 Hedging Incentive Compensation with Hidden Borrow-
ing and Lending
We turn our attention next to the case where the manager has no access to markets for
contingent claims, but only to markets where a riskless asset is traded, or equivalently
there can only be hidden borrowing and lending.30 Markets are again anonymous and
competitive: agents face a given unit price at which they are free to choose the level
of their trades. Since there are no informational asymmetries concerning the payoﬀ
of such claims, their price at equilibrium will be the same for sales and purchases and
equal to the common discount factor, p = 1. As in the previous section, we consider
the case where monitoring takes place only at date 1. We will also assume that
monitoring only takes place in state L. Indeed, numerical computations suggest that
this is again optimal. The intuition is as follows: if the manager were to save using
the riskless asset, these savings could be seized when he is monitored. But having
the savings seized is more of a penalty when output and hence his compensation is
low. Hence, for any given level of monitoring it is optimal that this is concentrated
in state L only.31
The optimal compensation scheme with hidden borrowing and lending (in a risk-
less asset) and random monitoring is then obtained as solution of the maximization














subject to the same participation constraint as in the previous Section, (8), and the





L )}−v(a) ≥ u(z0 − τ0)+





for all τ0,τ ∈ R2 such that τ0 + τ = 0. Let Zf(m) denote its solution.
Note that, when m =0 , P
0,f
MON is the “classic” problem yielding the optimal
contract with hidden savings. On the other hand, when m = 1, its solution is given
by the second best contract Z∗, i.e., by the optimal contract with no side trades
(with m = 1 the manager can in fact only use side trades to transfer income, at a
30This is the case which is most studied in the literature; see, e.g., Allen (1985) and Cole and
Kocherlakota (2001).
31This intuition also suggests that the same is true if additional monetary penalties (of size k)
can be imposed when hedging is detected, and numerical computations conﬁrm that.
23price equal to 1, from date 0 to state H at date 1 and from both states at date 1 to
date 0 - i.e., to borrow - and it is possible to verify that at the second best contract
the manager does not wish to engage in such trades).
As mentioned in the previous section, we know from Rogerson (1985) that at
the second best contract Z∗ in a two period framework the manager’s income is




if the manager can engage in hidden trades in a riskfree asset the optimal contract




0. In the Appendix we show that, in addition, all the properties of
the optimal contract established in the previous section for the case in which the
manager could hedge using a complete set of contingent claims remain valid when he
is restricted to side trades in a risk free asset.
Example 3 Consider again the same set-up of Example 2. The levels of the optimal
compensation for the case where side trades are restricted to risk free borrowing and
lending are reported in Panel C of Table 1 and in Figure 4. The results are qualita-
tively similar to what was found in Example 2 for the case where the manager can
use contingent claims to hedge his compensation. However, since here the scope for
hedging is more limited, the manager’s compensation is less distorted. Indeed, we ﬁnd
that mf ≈ 30%, which means that a lower monitoring probability is suﬃcient for the
manager’s compensation to be identical to the compensation he would get with perfect
observability. (In the case of hedging with contingent claims we had m+ ≈ 35%, and
even for m>m + the optimal compensation contract was not identical to the one
under perfect observability.) Finally, note that the main distortion when m is low is
that compensation is shifted from date 0 to state H.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
At least since the 1990s managers have had access to ﬁnancial instruments which
allow them to hedge the ﬁrm speciﬁc risk in their compensation packages. Moreover,
until recently, regulation has been ineﬀective in requiring managers to promptly dis-
close these ﬁnancial transactions to shareholders and other investors. The analysis of
these facts by legal and ﬁnancial commentators has generally come to the conclusion
that managerial hedging undermines incentives in executive pay schemes, signiﬁ-
cantly alters the executives’ eﬀective ownership of the ﬁrm, and hence has adverse
eﬀects on performance. But is this necessarily the case?
Boards and shareholders should have recognized the managers’ ability to hedge
their incentive compensation packages as well, and should have designed their man-
32In the previous Section (see Lemma 6 in the Appendix) we established the same property for
the optimal contract Z+ when there is full monitoring, but only in state L, of trades in contingent
claims.
24agers’ incentive schemes accordingly. If so, we show in this paper, they should monitor
their managers’ portfolio, scrutinize their ﬁnancial transactions, and possibly bring
derivative suits for violation of ﬁduciary duty when they observe transactions by
the managers which hedge the risk of incentive compensation beyond the amount
mutually understood to be acceptable.
In light of this, it is then somewhat puzzling, that executive pay contracts rarely
state explicitly the form and amount of hedging that managers are allowed to engage
in. Several explanations are however possible.
One possibility is that corporate governance is severely ineﬀective and boards
collude with executives to extract rents at the expense of shareholders, as argued
by Bebchuck and Fried (2003). In this case incentive pay schemes should not be
expected to restrict the managers’ hedging ability in ﬁnancial markets.
However another possibility is that the managers’ hedging transactions are al-
lowed to a limited extent because ﬁrms have incentives to design excessively risky
compensation packages, e.g., provide compensation largely in the form of stock op-
tions, due to their advantageous tax treatment. In this case, at the optimal contract,
some managerial hedging should be observed but this does not imply a violation of
ﬁduciary duty by managers and as a consequence no legal action against them by
shareholders should be observed. Also, it might be too costly or impossible to deﬁne
an eﬀective set of trading rules under all possible contingencies, and an incomplete
contract might serve the interests of managers and shareholders best, by protecting
the ﬁrm against “frivolous” legal action by shareholders. Furthermore, if hedging is
allowed against the excessive risk in the compensation packages due to tax advan-
tages, explicit mention in the contract of allowances for hedging might expose the
ﬁrm to legal action by the tax authority.
Finally, we note that i) steeper incentive contracts and hedging instruments have
appeared roughly simultaneously in the U.S. ﬁnancial markets, and ii) steeper in-
centive contracts characterize executive pay in the U.S. and U.K. than in continental
Europe, where ﬁnancial markets and in particular the market for hedging instru-
ments are less developed. This is consistent with the optimal contract characterized
in our paper, which implies a steeper incentive pay scheme when hedging instruments
hidden to shareholders are more widespread.
An additional implication of our analysis is that, the higher the level of monitor-
ing as dictated by legal disclosure requirements or corporate governance rules, the
less steep incentives contracts should be. Thus, it predicts that the recent increase
in disclosure requirements may reduce the steepness of incentive compensation and
hence reduce the amount of stocks and options granted. Moreover, as the hedging
markets develop, the optimal level of monitoring might well increase.
Our analysis of the optimal incentive compensation when managers can hedge the
idiosyncratic risk such compensation imposes on them and managerial hedging can
not be monitored perfectly also delivers other empirical implications which have not
25yet been studied. In particular, our analysis implies that monitoring of managers’
portfolios optimally occurs when ﬁrm performance is poor: increased scrutiny of
managers’ aﬀairs when a ﬁrm does poorly may hence be optimal rather than being
an attempt by shareholders to expropriate managers ex post. Moreover, we ﬁnd that,
conditional on the ﬁrm’s performance, the manager’s compensation is lower when his
portfolio is monitored, even if no hedging is revealed by monitoring; hence managers
may be worse oﬀ, i.e., their pay reduced, when their aﬀairs are scrutinized even if
they have done nothing wrong.
We interpret managerial hedging throughout as trades in contingent claims. But
we could alternatively interpret such activity as the manager borrowing from the
ﬁrm in an unobserved way and purchasing assets, such as houses. If the manager
plans on repaying these loans using his bonus when the ﬁrm performance is good, but
defaults on them when ﬁrm performance is bad while keeping the assets, such loans
provide insurance and are a way to hedge incentive compensation. In our model,
then, managers’ portfolios are optimally monitored following poor performance and
the extra assets bought with the loans forgiven by the ﬁrm are seized.33
33Such transactions are now explicitly prohibited by Section 402 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.
26Appendix: Proofs
Appendix A: Proofs for Section 2 - The Static Case
Proof of Proposition 1. Let (zm,znm) be the optimal contract (i.e., a solution of PMON)
when monitoring is exerted both in H and L. Such a contract as we said always implements





L )] ≥ v(a)−v(b).
Any transaction in the ﬁnancial market such that τH < 0,τ L > 0 (i.e., a sale of insurance)
increases the manager’s income in state H (when no monitoring occurs) and lowers it in
state L (whether or not monitoring occurs); as a consequence, the above inequality remains
valid, so that the agent still prefers to exert a high eﬀort level.
The optimality of (zm,znm) then implies that the manager cannot attain a higher level
of utility by engaging in such trades. Since the manager would keep exerting high eﬀort,
his trades would have no adverse eﬀect on the shareholders’ utility; therefore, if such trades
increase the manager’s utility we would have a contradiction to the optimality of (zm,znm).
We have thus shown that, if (zm,znm) is the solution of PMON (when monitoring is
exerted both in H and L), the manager never wants to engage in trades in the ﬁnancial
market that entail a sale of insurance, or the incentive compatibility constraint (2) never
binds with (−τH,τ L) ∈ R2
+ such that
P
s∈{H,L} πs(a)τs = 0. This implies that monitoring
is not needed to discourage trades consisting in the sale of insurance. It leaves us with
only one possible role for monitoring in state H, that of introducing some randomness
in the manager’s compensation in state H, which may vary according to whether or not
monitoring occurs: znm
H 6= zm
H. However, from the concavity of u(z) it follows that a pure
randomization of the manager’s compensation, i.e., not motivated by incentives, is never
optimal. 2
Proof of Proposition 2. From the form of the incentive compatibility constraint given
in (5) for the case m = 0 and the strict concavity of u(.)w eg e t 34
πH(a)u(zH)+πL(a)u(znm
L ) − v(a) >π H(b)u(zH)+πL(b)u(znm









which implies zH(0) >z ∗
H >z ∗
L >z nm
L (0), since both (zH(0),znm
L (0)) and (z∗
H,z∗
L) have
the same expected value (as they both satisfy (3) as an equality). 2
Lemma 2 At the optimal compensation scheme the incentive constraint (2) always holds
as an equality, for all m.
34Note that, for (5) to be satisﬁed we must have zH(0) >z nm
L (0), hence the strict in-
equality sign.
27Proof of Lemma 2. To induce the manager to exert high eﬀort his compensation, as
we argued, cannot be ﬂat. If (2) were holding as an inequality, it would still be satisﬁed
if we consider a small change in the compensation that keeps the expected value constant
and brings closer the payments in the H and the L state. This would still satisfy (1) and
increase the manager’s utility. A contradiction. 2
Lemma 3 Suppose that the manager’s preferences are such that u(z)=z1−σ
1−σ with 0 <σ<
1 or u(z) = ln(z). Then, at the optimal compensation scheme, the participation constraint
(1) holds as an equality, for all m.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose u(z)=z1−σ
1−σ with 0 <σ<1 and let z =( zH,znm
L ,zm
L )
be the optimal compensation. In the light of Proposition 1, the incentive compatibility
constraint (2), evaluated at λz, can be written as follows:
λ1−σ[πH(a)u(zH)+πL(a){(1 − m)u(znm
L )+mu(zm
L )}−(πH(b)u(zH − τH)+
+πL(b){(1 − m)u(znm
L − τL)+mu(zm
L − max{τL,0})})] ≥ v(a) − v(b),
for all budget feasible τH,τ L. Hence, since z is incentive compatible, so is λz for all λ>1.
Evidently, λz is preferable to z, for all λ>1. Since z is optimal, λz must then violate the
participation constraint (1), for all λ>1, which implies that (1) must hold as equality for
z.
Proceeding similarly for u(z) = ln(z) we ﬁnd that in that case the set of incentive com-
patible compensation schemes is a convex cone (if z satisﬁes (2) so does λz for all λ>0). 2
Proof of Proposition 3. For all m ≥ m∗, by construction we have:
u0(z∗
H) ≥ (1 − m)u0(z∗
L).
Condition (7) is thus satisﬁed when zH = z∗
H, znm
L = z∗
L, so that the manager does not
wish to make any trade when he switches to low eﬀort: τH = τL = 0. Since high eﬀort was
sustainable at z∗
H, z∗
L with m =1 , it will also be for all m ≥ m∗. 2
Proof of Proposition 4. Fix m and omit for simplicity to write the optimal com-
pensation as a function of m. We ﬁrst show that the optimal level of trades in the market
(obtained from (6)) is characterized by τH > 0.
Suppose instead that (zH,znm
L ,zm
L ) are such that τH = τL = 0 at the optimal contract.
Thus, z(m) satisﬁes u0(zH) ≥ (1 − m)u0(znm
L ) and
πH(a)u(zH)+πL(a)[mu(zm
L )+( 1− m)u(znm
L )] − v(a) ≥
πH(b)u(zH)+πL(b)[mu(zm
L )+( 1− m)u(znm
L )] − v(b)
as well as the participation constraint. We will ﬁrst argue that znm
L = zm
L . To see this
assume the opposite and notice that there exists a perturbation (dznm
L ,dzm
L ) such that
mu0(zm
L )dzm
L +( 1− m)u0(znm
L )dznm
L =0 ,
28i.e., keeping the expected utility in the low state the same, which relaxes the participation
constraint since mdzm
L +( 1− m)dznm
L < 0, a contradiction. Note that, by the envelope
theorem, we need not consider if the manager hedges his compensation due to the marginal
change. Also, notice that the value function is diﬀerentiable at the point where τ reaches
zero, since the right hand derivative and left hand derivative coincide at that point. We
use this fact throughout the proofs. Now, since m<m ∗, we know that















L). But since the two compensation schemes have the same expected value
and do not coincide, we conclude that z∗
H >z H and znm
L >z ∗
L. (For suppose otherwise,
i.e., zH >z ∗
H which implies znm
L <z ∗
L. Then, u0(zH) <u 0(z∗
H). But above inequality
then requires that u0(znm
L ) <u 0(z∗
L) which contradicts znm
L <z ∗
L.) But this contradicts the
(second best) optimality of the compensation (z∗
H,z∗
L).
We now turn to prove the other (and main) statement of the proposition. Suppose
znm
L ≤ zm
L . Consider then an inﬁnitesimal change in the compensation (dzH,dznm
L ,dzm
L ),
with dzH =0 ,d z nm
L > 0 >d z m
L , leaving unchanged the manager’s expected utility (and














L ) ≤ m(−dzm
L ).
As a consequence the participation constraint (1) still holds since the eﬀect on it of the




with the inequality being strict if znm
L <z m
L .
Finally, the eﬀect of the change on the value of the term on the right hand side of the





L } < 0,
where the strict inequality follows from the fact, shown in (i), that τL < 0. Thus, the change
allows to keep the manager’s utility unchanged while making the incentive constraint slack,
a contradiction. 2
Proof of Proposition 5. Fix m<m ∗ and drop it as an argument of the compensation
for simplicity. Consider a perturbation dm > 0 and (dzH,dznm
L ,dzm
L ) with dzH = dznm
L =0











The eﬀect of this perturbation on the objective and the left hand side of the incentive
constraint (2) is
πL(a){(u(zm
L ) − u(znm












L ) − (u(znm
L ) − u(zm
L ))}dm > 0
due to the concavity of u. Thus, there is a dzm





m dm and such that
the eﬀect on the objective equals zero. The eﬀect on the right hand side of (2) evaluated
at such a value of dzm
L is
πL(b){(u(zm
L ) − u(znm
L − τL))dm + mu0(zm
L )dzm
L } < 0
since u(znm
L − τL) − u(zm
L ) >u (znm
L ) − u(zm
L ). By continuity, there is a dzm
L such that the
eﬀect on the objective and the left hand side of the incentive constraint is strictly positive
while the eﬀect on the right hand side is strictly negative. Such a perturbation is incentive
compatible and a strict improvement. 2
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof proceeds exactly as the proof of Proposition 4 under
the assumption that monitoring occurs in state L only. We will hence only sketch the proof
here. Suppose, by contradiction, that znm
L ≤ zm
L and consider a change in compensation
such that dznm
L > 0 >d z m
L , leaving the manager’s expected utility (and hence the term on





L } =0 .
Since u0(zm
L ) ≤ u0(znm
L ) the participation constraint (1) still holds. The eﬀect of the change






with strict inequality when τL < 0. Thus, the change allows to keep the manager’s utility
unchanged while making the incentive constraint slack, a contradiction.2
Appendix B: Formal Statements and Proofs for Section 3.1 -
The Intertemporal Case with Contingent Claims
Let T denote the set of all budget feasible trades in ﬁnancial markets, given by (τ0,τ H,−τL) ∈
R3 such that
τ0 + πH(b)max{τH,0} + πL(b)min{τL,0} + πH(a)min{τH,0} + πL(a)max{τL,0} =0 .
30Lemma 4 The compensation scheme obtained as solution of problem P0
MON is also a
solution of the same problem when (i) monitoring in state H is also allowed; (ii) the set of
admissible trades T (b) is replaced by the larger set T .
Proof of Lemma 4. We will rely on the characterization of P0
MON obtained in this
Appendix. In Proposition 8, we conclude that zm
L ≤ znm
L <z 0 <z H no matter what m is.
Let us consider purchases of claims on H (dτH < 0 and dτ0 > 0) at price πH(a) such
that dτ0+πH(a)dτH = 0 starting from a zero deviation. Suppose the manager puts in high
eﬀort (a). The beneﬁt of the purchase would be −πH(a)u0(zH)dτH and the cost −u0(z0)dτ0
and thus the net beneﬁt −πH(a)(u0(zH)−u0(z0))dτH < 0. Suppose the manager puts in low
eﬀort (b). The beneﬁt would then be −πH(b)u0(zH)dτH and the cost would be unchanged.
Thus, the net beneﬁt would be −(πH(b)u0(zH)−πH(a)u0(z0))dτH < 0. Hence, the manager
would never buy claims on state H at price πH(a).
Let us consider sales of claims on L (dτL > 0 and dτ0 < 0) at price πL(a) such that
dτ0+πL(a)dτL = 0 starting from a zero deviation. Suppose the manager puts in high eﬀort
(a). The beneﬁt of the purchase would be −u0(z0)dτ0 and the cost −πL(a)((1−m)u0(znm
L )+
mu0(zm
L ))dτL and thus the net beneﬁt πL(a)(u0(z0)−((1−m)u0(znm
L )+mu0(zm
L )))dτL < 0.
Suppose the manager puts in low eﬀort (b). The beneﬁt would then be unchanged and
the cost would be −πL(b)((1 − m)u0(znm
L )+mu0(zm
L ))dτL. Thus, the net beneﬁt would be
(πL(a)u0(z0)−πL(b)((1−m)u0(znm
L )+mu0(zm
L )))dτL < 0. Hence, the manager would never
sell claims on state L at price πL(a) either.
Notice that any trade involving either purchases of H claims (dτH < 0) or sales of
L claims (dτL > 0) or both (with dτ0 ≶ 0) could hence be improved upon and thus the
manager would never consider such trades.
In sum, given these prices, the manager would not want to sell claims on state L or
purchase claims on state H. But then, given our assumption about the form of penalties,
monitoring in state H is irrelevant. 2
We establish ﬁrst a preliminary result on the properties of the solutions of problem
P0
MON, analogous to what we found in the previous section (Lemmas 2 and 3):
Lemma 5 At an optimal compensation scheme, u(zH) > (1 − m)u(znm
L )+mu(zm
L ) and
the incentive compatibility constraint (9) always holds as equality, for all m. Moreover,
a suﬃcient condition for the participation constraint (8) to also hold as equality is that
u(z)=z1−σ
1−σ with 0 <σ<1 or u(z) = ln(z).
Proof of Lemma 5. The inequality u(zH) > (1−m)u(znm
L )+mu(zm
L ) is clearly needed to
support high eﬀort with a zero level of side trades; with non-zero trades in ﬁnancial markets
it must also hold, a fortiori. Suppose next that (9) were not binding. Then the manager’s
utility could be increased by lowering the utility of the payment in state H and increasing
the one in state L, while keeping unchanged the total expected payment, a contradiction.
31The proof of the second claim follows the proof of Lemma 3 quite closely and is hence
omitted.2
Next we provide a comparison of the case with no monitoring, i.e., m = 0, and with
perfect monitoring in state L, i.e., m = 1, which is the problem denoted P0
SBc in the text.
Lemma 6 (i) The optimal contract with zero monitoring, Z(0) is such that zH(0) >
z0(0) >z nm
L (0) and u0(z0(0)) = πH(a)u0(zH(0)) + πL(a)u0(znm
L (0)). (ii) The optimal con-
tract with perfect monitoring, m =1 , is given by the compensation scheme Z+ solving
problem P0




0 ) <π H(a)u0(z+
H)+πL(a)u0(z+
L).
Proof of Lemma 6. (i): When m = 0, (9) can be written as:
u(z0)+πH(a)u(zH)+πL(a)u(znm













where the term on the right hand side reﬂects the fact that, with no monitoring, the best
the manager can do by trading in the market is to perfectly smooth his income across time
and the two states.35 The ﬁrst order conditions for problem P0




























where µ and λ are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints (8) and (9)







πL(a) > 1 >
πH(b)
πH(a), from the equations
in (12) we get zH(0) >z 0(0) >z nm
L (0). Furthermore, u0(z0(0)) = πH(a)u0(zH(0)) +
πL(a)u0(znm
L (0)).





























where µ and λ are the multipliers associated with the two constraints of P0
SBc and ¯ z+
d is
as deﬁned earlier. Hence we have z+
H >z +





35Since, as we show below, zH >z 0 >z nm
L , the smoothing of income requires selling H
claims and buying L claims; it will then take place at prices π(b).
32¯ z+
d >z +




d )) >u 0(z+












L. Finally, summing the last two equations in (13), multiplied by πH(a) and πL(a),








L) − u0(¯ z+
d )) >u 0(z+
0 ),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that u0(z+
L) >u 0(¯ z+
d ). 2
Proposition 6 Comparing the optimal compensation schemes in an intertemporal frame-
work with full and with no monitoring, if the participation constraint binds in both cases,
we have: zH(0) − znm
L (0) >z +
H − z+
L, zH(0) >z +
H, and, if u000 > 0, then z+
0 >z 0(0).



























L ) − v(b);
we see that the feasible set of problem P0
MON when m = 0 is clearly contained in the
feasible set of problem P0
SBc. As a consequence, the solution Z(0) of the ﬁrst problem is
also an admissible solution of the second, P0
SBc. However, it is not the optimal solution of
such problem since, as we saw in Lemma 6, znm
L (0) is strictly smaller than both zH(0) and
z0(0). So the inequality in (14) is strict, or the incentive compatibility constraint of P0
SBc
is slack at Z(0). Hence the manager, by choosing the optimal deviation when m = 0, must

























Deﬁne the expected cost of the manager’s compensation z =( z0,z H,z L), when he exerts
eﬀort e, as PVe(z)=z0 + πH(e)zH + πL(e)zL. Notice that PVb(z)=PVa(z) − (πH(a) −
πH(b))(zH − zL). Under the assumption that the participation constraint is binding both
at the solution of P0
SBc and of P0
MON, the expected cost under eﬀort a is the same at
the solutions of the two problems: PVa(z+)=PVa(Z(0)). Suppose the ﬁrst claim in the
Proposition does not hold, i.e., z+
H−z+
L ≥ zH(0)−znm
L (0). Then from the above expressions

















33since otherwise a lottery with (weakly) lower expected value would never be preferred.




L (0), that z+
H >z H(0). Hence from (16) we get z+
0 <z 0(0), and so, recalling the




0 ) >u 0(z0(0)) = πH(a)u0(zH(0)) + πL(a)u0(znm
L (0)).
(17)
But this contradicts our previous ﬁnding that zH(0) <z +
H and znm




L <z H(0) − znm
L (0).
By the same argument, (zH(0),znm
L (0)) 6≤ (z+
H,z+
L). Suppose this was not true, i.e.,
(zH(0),znm
L (0)) ≤ (z+
H,z+
L). Since PVa(z+)=PVa(Z(0)), we have z+
0 ≤ z0(0). Thus
again u0(z+
0 ) ≥ u0(z0(0)), which together with the properties established in Lemma 6 leads
to a contradiction. Thus, (zH(0),znm
L (0)) 6≤ (z+
H,z+
L).
Combining this property with the fact that, as shown above, z+
H − z+
L <z H(0) − znm
L ,
we must have zH(0) >z +
H.
To prove the last claim of the Proposition we also proceed by contradiction: suppose
u000 > 0 and z+
0 ≤ z0(0). From the property u0(z0(0)) = πH(a)u0(zH(0)) + πL(a)u0(znm
L (0))
established in Lemma 6, we get z0(0) <π H(a)zH(0) + πL(a)znm
L (0). Moreover, given
the properties zH(0) >z +
H and PVa(z+)=PVa(Z(0)) shown above, if z+
0 ≤ z0(0) the
following must hold: z+
L >z nm
L (0) and πH(a)z+
H + πL(a)z+
L ≥ πH(a)zH(0) + πL(a)znm
L (0).
As a consequence, since u0 is decreasing and convex, and the lottery (zH(0),znm
L (0)) has
higher variance and lower mean than the lottery (z+
H,z+
L), we must have
πH(a)u0(zH(0)) + πL(a)u0(znm
L (0)) >π H(a)u0(z+
H)+πL(a)u0(z+
L).
This inequality in turn implies, using the relationships established in Lemma 6, that z+
0 >
z0(0), i.e., a contradiction. 2
Remark 2 It is possible to show that exactly the same properties as those established
in Proposition 6 hold when the optimal compensation scheme with no monitoring,
Z(0), is compared to the optimal compensation scheme with full monitoring in all
markets (i.e., also at date 0), given by the incentive eﬃcient contract Z∗.
We consider then the case of imperfect monitoring: m ∈ (0,1).
Proposition 7 Let m+ ≡ 1 − u0(¯ z+
d )/u0(z+
L). Then, m+ < 1 and, for any m ≥ m+, the
optimal contract with perfect monitoring, Z+, solves P0
MON.




we have then z+
H > ¯ z+
d >z +
0 , so that m+ < 1.
Consider then the optimal deviation in problem P0
MON (i.e., the best trades the manager






34The ﬁrst order conditions for the above problem are
u0(z0 − τ0) ≤ u0(zH − τH) (18)
u0(z0 − τ0) ≥ (1 − m)u0(znm
L − τL),
with equalities if, respectively τH > 0,τ L < 0. We will show that, when m ≥ m+ these




L] with τL =0 . Since, as we already noticed,
z+
H >z +
0 , when τL = 0 the optimal choice of the trades in the other markets τ0,τ H is
at a level such that z0 − τ0 = zH − τH =¯ z+
d . Substituting these values in the ﬁrst order
conditions above, the ﬁrst one is trivially satisﬁed while the second one has the following
expression:
u0(¯ z+
d ) ≥ (1 − m)u0(z+
L),
always satisﬁed for m+ ≤ m.
Thus, when m ≥ m+ the manager does not wish to trade in the market for L claims. As
a consequence, since z+ constitutes the optimal contract when the manager cannot engage
in such trades in the L market (m = 1), it is also the optimal choice when m ≥ m+. 2
Proposition 8 For any m<m + the optimal compensation scheme Z(m) is such that
(i) if the manager were to deviate, he would choose τL < 0, and (ii) zH(m) >z 0(m) >
znm
L (m) >z m
L (m).F o rm ≥ m+,z H(m) >z 0(m) >z nm
L (m)=zm
L (m).
Proof of Proposition 8. (i) Notice that if the manager were to choose τL = 0, then we
know from the ﬁrst order conditions of P0
MON that znm
L (m)=zm
L (m). Moreover, the ﬁrst
order conditions of P0
MON and P0
SBc would coincide except for the additional constraint
in P0
MON that u0(z0 − τ0) ≥ (1 − m)u0(znm
L ). But, generically, Z+ does not satisfy this
additional constraint, a contradiction.
(ii) We ﬁrst show that znm
L (m) >z m
L (m) for m<m +. The proof follows very similar
lines to that of claim (ii) of Proposition 4. Suppose znm
L ≤ zm
L . Consider the perturbation
dz =( dz0,dz H,dznm
L ,dzm
L ) with dz0 = dzH = 0 and dznm
L > 0 >d z m
L such that its eﬀect





L } =0 .
This perturbation satisﬁes the participation constraint since πL(a){(1−m)dznm
L +mdzm
L }≤






with strict inequality, by claim (i) of this Proposition, if m<m +. Thus, the pertur-
bation renders the incentive constraint slack, while the manager’s utility is unchanged, a
contradiction.
Next we show that zH >z 0 >z nm
L for m<m +. By claim (i) of this Proposition τL < 0.
The ﬁrst order condition of the optimal deviation then implies (1 − m)u0(znm
L − τL)=
35u0(z0 − τ0). But then, using the envelope theorem and the ﬁrst order conditions of the































L <z 0. Moreover, again using the ﬁrst order condition of the optimal deviation
u0(z0 −τ0) ≤ u0(zH −τH). If the inequality is strict, τH = 0 which implies that τ0 > 0 and,
in turn, z0 >z H. But this is not possible since otherwise the perturbation dzH > 0 >d z 0
such that u0(z0)dz0 + πH(a)u0(zH)dzH = 0 would be feasible (dz0 + πH(a)dzH = 0) and
would relax the incentive constraint (the eﬀect on the right hand side, again using the
envelope theorem, is u0(z0 −τ0)dz0 +πH(b)u0(zH)dzH < 0). Thus, the ﬁrst order condition


















Thus, zH >z 0 >z nm
L >z m
L for m<m +.
Finally, if m ≥ m+, then by Proposition 7, Z(m) satisﬁes z0 = z+










Appendix C: Formal Statements and Proofs for Section 3.2 -
The Intertemporal Case with Borrowing and Lending














Proof of Proposition 9. Consider the optimal deviation in problem P
0,f
MON when m =0 :
u(z0)+πH(a)u(zH)+πL(a)u(znm
L ) − v(a) ≥
max
τ0,τ∈R2:τ0+τ=0
u(z0 − τ0)+πH(b)u(zH − τ)+πL(b)u(znm
L − τ) − v(b) ≥
u(z0)+πH(b)u(zH)+πL(b)u(znm
L ) − v(b).
This implies that u(zH)−u(znm
L ) ≥
v(a)−v(b)
πH(a)−πH(b). At the second best contract Z∗, as already









L), and hence z∗
H >z ∗







which implies that Z∗ is not an admissible solution of P
0,f
MON, since at that compensation
contract the agent would like to save and would then be able to achieve a higher utility by















L (0)) ≤ (z∗
H,z∗










L (0)), which implies
τ0 > 0 >τ . Consider dz =( dz0,dz H,dznm
L ) with dz0 < 0 <d z H = dznm
L such that the
change in the value of the objective function of P
0,f
MON (and hence of the term on the left














L (0)) (which again follows from (19)), we
have dz0 + dzH < 0, i.e., the participation constraint is still satisﬁed. Using the ﬁrst









L (0) − τ), we ﬁnd
u0(z
f




L (0) − τ)dzH < 0,
i.e., the perturbation dz also allows to relax the incentive compatibility constraint, which










H, and hence z
nm,f
L (0) >z ∗
L. But this contradicts equation (20)
above. As a consequence we must have z
f
H(0) >z ∗





L (0) >z ∗
H − z∗
L, as stated in the Proposition.
It remains then to show that, if u000 > 0,z
f
0(0) <z ∗




This implies, using the participation constraint, that z
nm,f






L (0) ≤ πH(a)z∗
H + πL(a)z∗
L. But then, noting that the previous inequality can
























for e ∈{ a,b} (where we again used (19)). This inequality again implies that the same
perturbation dz considered earlier, which does not aﬀect the value of the objective function,
also satisﬁes the participation constraint: dz0 + dzH < 0. By the same argument as
above, using the ﬁrst order conditions for the optimal level of side trades we ﬁnd that








L (0) − τ))dzH < 0,




Proposition 10 There exists mf ∈ (0,1) such that for all m ≥ mf, the optimal compen-
sation scheme obtained from problem P
0,f
MON is given by the second best contract, Z∗, and
at this contract the optimal deviation is characterized by τ0 = τ =0 .
Proof of Proposition 10. Consider the ﬁrst order conditions for the optimal level of side
trades at a solution Zf(m) of problem P
0,f
MON(m). If τ ≤ 0 we have
u0(z
f
0(m) − τ0) ≥ πH(b)u0(z
f
H(m) − τ)+πL(b)(1 − m)u0(z
nm,f































we have 0 <m f < 1. For all m ≥ mf, by construction the ﬁrst order conditions for the
optimal level of side trades hold at Z∗ with τ = 0, hence Z∗ is an admissible solution and
hence the optimal solution of P
0,f
MON(m). 2
Proposition 11 For m<m f, the optimal compensation contract Zf(m) is diﬀerent
from the second best, Z∗, and such that znm
L (m) ≥ zm
L (m); at such contract, the optimal
deviation is characterized by τ<0.
Proof of Proposition 11. To prove the ﬁrst claim, suppose the optimal level of side









L − τ)} (21)









Consider the perturbation dz0 > 0 >d z H = dznm
L = dzm
L ≡ dz1 such that dz0 + dz1 =0 .
























38where µ and λ are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints of problem
P
0,f
MON(m), and the last equality follows from (21) together with the ﬁrst order condition
with respect to z
f
0. As a consequence, the eﬀect of the perturbation dz0,dz 1 on the value
of the objective function of P
0,f










L )}]dz1 =0 ,
Also, its eﬀect on the value of the term on the right hand side of the incentive compatibility
constraint is
u0(z0 − τ0)dz0 +( πH(b)u0(zH − τ)+πL(b){(1 − m)u0(znm
L − τ)+mu0(zm
L − τ)})dz1 =
u0(z0 − τ0)(dz0 + dz1)=0 .
Thus, the perturbation is admissible and does not decrease the value of the objective
function. Hence, whenever the optimal deviation is characterized by τ>0 we can always
ﬁnd an alternative solution, with higher z0 and lower zH,znm
L ,zm
L at which the optimal
deviation is τ ≤ 0.




L), so that the manager would save at Z∗.
Moreover, using the ﬁrst order conditions of problem P
0,f
MON at τ = 0, we have znm
L = zm
L ≡
zL. Next, note that given τ = 0, the incentive compatibility constraint implies








where the second equality uses the incentive compatibility constraint of the second best
problem. Now, there are two cases to consider: on the one hand, if zH >z ∗
H, then using (22)
zL >z ∗
L and, using the participation constraint, z0 <z ∗
0; on the other hand, if zH <z ∗
H,
then zL <z ∗
L and z0 >z ∗













and Z∗ satisﬁes an equivalent equation. But then (zH,z L) > (z∗
H,z∗

























a contradiction. When (zH,z L) < (z∗
H,z∗
L) and z0 >z ∗
0, both inequalities are reversed,
again a contradiction. We conclude that τ<0.
The proof that znm
L (m) ≥ zm
L (m) is identical to the proof of the corresponding claim in
Proposition 8. 2
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43Table 1: Managerial Compensation with Portfolio Monitoring
Panel A: Optimal Compensation: One Period Case
Monitoring Probability Perfect
m =0 m =0 .2 m ≥ m∗ Observability
zH 1.1210 1.1116 1.1091 1.1091
znm
L 0.6370 0.6748 0.6727 0.6727
zm
L n.a. 0.6268 0.6727 n.a.
τH 0.3630 0.1893 0 n.a.
τL -0.1210 -0.0631 0 n.a.
V -0.2771 -0.2727 -0.2715 -0.2715
Panel B: Optimal Compensation: Two Period Case
Monitoring Probability Perfect
m =0 m =0 .2 m ≥ m+ Observability
z0 0.6041 0.6214 0.6271 0.6250
zH 0.7280 0.6989 0.6911 0.6932
znm
L 0.3999 0.4262 0.4184 0.4204
zm
L n.a. 0.3840 0.4184 n.a.
τ0 0.0611 0.0183 -0.0128 n.a.
τH 0.1850 0.0958 0.0512 n.a.
τL -0.1431 -0.0563 0 n.a.
V -1.2214 -1.2129 -1.2116 -1.2115
Panel C: Optimal Compensation: Two Period Case with Hidden Risk Free
Borrowing and Lending Only
Monitoring Probability Perfect
m =0 m =0 .2 m ≥ mf Observability
z0 0.6084 0.6206 0.6250 0.6250
zH 0.7156 0.6985 0.6932 0.6932
znm
L 0.4197 0.4257 0.4204 0.4204
zm
L n.a. 0.4079 0.4204 n.a.
τ0 0.0689 0.0246 0 n.a.
τ1 -0.0689 -0.0246 0 n.a.
V -1.2150 -1.2118 -1.2115 -1.2115
44Figure 1: Managerial Compensation with Portfolio Monitoring: One Period Case.
Compensation as a function of monitoring probability m. Top three lines plot zH(m)
(solid), z∗
H (dotted), and zH(0) (dashed). Bottom four lines plot znm
L (m) and zm
L (m) (both
solid), z∗
L (dotted), and znm
L (0) (dashed).












































































45Figure 2: Managerial Compensation with Portfolio Monitoring: One Period Case
with Alternative Speciﬁcation of Penalties.
Compensation as a function of monitoring probability m. Top ﬁve lines plot zH(m) (solid),
z∗
H (dotted), zH(0) (dashed), zH(m|k =0 .02) (dash-dotted), and zH(m|k =0 .05) (bold
dotted). Bottom eight lines plot znm
L (m), zm




L (m|k =0 .02) and zm
L (m|k =0 .02) (both dash-dotted), and znm
L (m|k =0 .05) and
zm
L (m|k =0 .05) (both bold dotted).












































































Monitoring with Penalty k=0.02
Monitoring with Penalty k=0.05
46Figure 3: Managerial Compensation with Portfolio Monitoring: Two Period Case.
Compensation as a function of monitoring probability m. Top four lines plot zH(m) (solid),
z∗
H (dotted), zH(0) (dashed), and z+
H (dash-dotted). Middle three lines plot z0(m) (solid),
z∗
0 (dotted), z0(0) (dashed), and z+
0 (dash-dotted). Bottom four lines plot znm
L (m) and
zm
L (m) (both solid), z∗
L (dotted), znm
L (0) (dashed), and z+
L (dash-dotted).





































































































47Figure 4: Managerial Compensation with Portfolio Monitoring: Hidden Risk Free
Borrowing and Lending Only
Compensation as a function of monitoring probability m. Top three lines plot zH(m) (solid),
z∗
H (dotted), and zH(0) (dashed). Middle three lines plot z0(m) (solid), z∗
0 (dotted), and
z0(0) (dashed). Bottom four lines plot znm
L (m) and zm
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